We propose a new scheme for sharing symmetric key operations among a set of participants according to a ) , ( n t threshold access structure. We focus on anonymity properties of this scheme and show that this scheme provides improved values of anonymity measures than the existing ones. In particular, the scheme can provide optimal and equitable participant anonymity when it is based on balanced perfect hash families.
Introduction
Schemes for sharing symmetric key operations such as block ciphers or message authentication codes have been of considerable recent interest, as evident from the significant contributions by Brickell et al. (2000) , Martin et al. (2003 Martin et al. ( , 2005 , Long et al. (2006) , Martin and Ng (2007) , Zaverucha and Stinson (2010) and others. Threshold access structures play a crucial role in this context. A ) , ( n t threshold access structure involves n participants such that every group of t participants has access to at least one key, while no set of t-1 or fewer participants has access to any key. Let Γ be the collection of all groups of t participants, and let A denote any typical member of Γ . Thus, every ) ( Γ ∈ A , representing a group of t participants, is an authorized set.
The key components are distributed to the participants by a receiver. Then one group ) ( Γ ∈ A of participants collaborate to perform a threshold operation such as encryption or authentication, using a key at their disposal, and sends the output of the shared operation back to the receiver. Once the receiver receives this message, he knows which key was used in the threshold operation. The objective is to prevent an adversary from learning which group of participants collaborated to perform the operation. The adversary may be the receiver or anyone knowing how key components are assigned to participants. So, given that a particular key was used, the issue of anonymity of the group ) ( Γ ∈ A of participants which has performed the threshold operation is of importance. Similarly, the anonymity of any individual participant, as a member of that group, is also of concern. It is assumed that the communication of the message to the receiver is done using an anonymous channel and all details of communications among the participants remain unknown to the adversary. Martin et al. (2003) gave a measure for group anonymity which essentially measures the average degree of anonymity for a scheme. In a recent work, Zaverucha and Stinson (2010;  hereafter referred to as ZS) proposed an elegant new scheme for sharing symmetric key operations amongst a set of participants according to a ) , ( n t threshold access structure. Focusing attention on access structures based on perfect hash families (PHFs), they explored at length the question of anonymity. They pointed out that anonymity should preferably be evaluated in the worst case instead of the average case and from this perspective, they gave a measure for group anonymity for their scheme, together with a measure of anonymity of any individual participant as a member of that group.
They showed that their scheme ensures a higher level of anonymity than the existing ones. Accordingly, we consider this scheme of ZS as our starting point.
In this article, we adopt the measures of ZS and examine how, for a ) , ( n t threshold access structure determined by any given PHF, further improvement in anonymity can be achieved. In Section 4, we propose a new scheme where, instead of all ) ( Γ ∈ A being equally likely to use a key, as stipulated in the scheme of ZS, these groups A now act with appropriately assigned unequal probabilities. We demonstrate that this new scheme has improved anonymity compared to the scheme of ZS and prove that it can, in fact, be optimal and equitable with respect to participant anonymity when based on a balanced PHF. In the process, in Section 3, we note that some results in ZS on participant anonymity require re-evaluation and we set them in the proper perspective. Finally, in Section 6, we show that our new scheme turns out to be quite promising even for threshold access structures which are given by combinatorial entities other than PHFs.
Notation and Preliminaries
For ease in reference, we begin with a brief description of PHFs and the associated ) , ( n t threshold access structures; for details on sharing symmetric key operations we refer to ZS and the references Following ZS, this BPHF(3:6,2,2) leads to a scheme with a (2,6) threshold access structure having (a) six [= (3)(2)] key components
(1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (2,2), (3,1), (3,2), such that each row index of B, coupled with a symbol in B, gives a key component;
such that each key is given by the Cartesian product of a row index of B with the set of two symbols in that row of B, and (c) six participants 6 1 ,..., P P , such that the key components given to any participant are dictated by the corresponding column of B, i.e., 1 P gets key components (1,1), (2,1), (3,1); 2 P gets key components (1,1), (2,1), (3,2); 3 P gets key components (1,1), (2,2), (3,2), and so on. , when written as an n l × array B, leads to a scheme based on a ) , ( n t threshold access structure involving By (c), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the participants and the columns of B, and hence by (b), any group of w participants can recover a specific key Therefore, as noted in ZS, the following are evident:
• Every group ) ( Γ ∈ A of participants can recover at least one key.
• No set of participants, involving less than t members, can recover any key.
Let A s ) 1 (≥ denote the number of keys that the participants in ) ( Γ ∈ A can collectively recover. In
, and so on.
We now present the measures of group and participant anonymity as given in ZS. In connection with the use of any specific key, these quantify the level of confidentiality of the group of t participants that have collaborated to use the key, or that of any individual participant as a member of this group. To that effect, for a scheme S, given that the key )
× denote the conditional probability that the group ) ( Γ ∈ A of participants has used this key, and let
is in the group of participants that has used this key. Then the measures of group and participant anonymity of the scheme S are given by
and
respectively. In the same spirit, the anonymity of any particular participant c P is measured by
All these measures are intended to protect against the worst possible scenario. A useful scheme should aim at achieving larger values of the quantities in (1)-(3). Moreover, it is desirable that participant anonymity should be equitable, i.e., the values of )
. A scheme achieving this is said to have optimal participant anonymity; cf. ZS.
ZS scheme revisited
ZS gave a scheme, focusing largely on BPHFs, and called this BPHF-MAC. They showed that this BPHF-MAC leads to improved anonymity compared to existing schemes. Their scheme is applicable also to constructions from PHFs which need not be balanced. We call their procedure the ZS scheme in general. In Section 4, we will modify the ZS scheme to ensure further gains in anonymity. Towards this, in this section, we revisit the ZS scheme in order to get a clear insight into its anonymity properties. In the process, a few examples are worked out in detail in order to indicate an anomaly in their results on participant anonymity.
With reference to a ) , ( n t threshold access structure given by a ) , , ; ( PHF t m n l , the ZS scheme has the following features:
are all equally likely to use a key.
(ii) If a group ) ( Γ ∈ A uses a key, then it employs any one of its available A s keys with equal probability.
The main innovation by ZS lies in (ii) since in earlier schemes, any group A, with access to multiple keys of the form ) ( J r K × , had to always use the key with smallest r. ZS showed that a modification as in (ii) entails gains in anonymity compared to the earlier schemes. We will show in Section 4 that a modification to (i) above leads to further gains in anonymity.
denote the collection of the groups of participants that can recover this key, i.e.,
, the participants in A can recover the key ) Clearly, by (i) above, the unconditional probability for any group ) ( Γ ∈ A to use a key is
while by (ii), the conditional probability for the use of the key ) ( J r K × , given that the group A has used a key, is
Hence, as also noted in equation (9) of ZS, in their scheme the key ) ( J r K × is used with unconditional probability
Therefore, using the standard conditional probability formula
for any Γ ∈ A , under the ZS scheme, by (5)- (7) it follows that
= 0, otherwise. This is essentially same as their equation (10). Furthermore, given that the key ) ( J r K × has been used, participant c P is in the group that has used this key if and only if A P c ∈ and A has used the key, for some )
. Thus for the ZS scheme,
where the indicator cA δ equals 1 if A P c ∈ , and 0 otherwise.
Some Examples and their implications
In their Section 3.2, ZS remarked that their BPHF-MAC scheme provides optimal and equitable participant anonymity and to establish this it was claimed in their Theorem 3.14 that for their
and that as a result 
The next two examples demonstrate that the assertions (11)- (13) 
Turning to the keys ) 12 2 ( × K and ) 12 3 ( × K , it may be verified in a similar manner that 
for the ZS scheme. Here t = 2, n = 6, and the right-hand sides of (11) and (12) equal 1/3 and 2/3 respectively, which are not in agreement with (14) and (15) accessed from the PHF tables by Walker (2011 (1,9,15) A(1,9,16) A(7,4,3) A (7,4,15) A(7,4,16) A(7,6,3) A(7,6,15) (7,6,16) A(7,9,3) A(7,9,15) A(7,9,16) A(11,4,3) A(11,4,15) A(11,4,16 (11,6,3) A(11,6,15) A(11,6,16) A(11,9,3) A(11,9,15) A(11,9,16) 3 2 2 2 2 3
Hence with 1 Γ = {(1,4,16), (1,6,16), (7,6,16)}, 2 Γ = {(1,4,3), (1,4,15), (1,9,3), (1,9,16), (7,6,3), (7,6,15), (7,9,3), (11, 4, 15) , (11, 6, 15) , (11, 6, 16) , (11,9,3), (11,9,15)}, 3 Γ = {(1,6,3), (1,6,15), (1,9,15), (7,4,3), (7,4,15), (7,4,16), (7,9,15), (7,9,16), (11, 4, 3) , (11, 4, 16) , (11, 6, 3) , (11,9,16)}, it follows from (9) 
for the ZS scheme. Here m = 6, n = 18, and the right-hand side of (13) equals 2/3, implying ρ = 2/3, which is not in agreement with (16) obtained via explicit calculation. □
Examples 1 and 2 demonstrate a conflict between the reality and equations (11)- (13) Example 3. Consider a ) 3 , 3 , 9 ; 4 ( BPHF represented by the 9 4 × array (cf. ZS) B = 1 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 1, 1 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 which gives a (3, 9) threshold access structure with 12 key components, 4 keys and 9 participants 9 1 ,..., P P
. Calculations similar to those in Examples 1 and 2 show that here µ = 21 20 , ρ = 3 2 and
, for the ZS scheme. □ While the ) ( c P ρ values in Example 3 are consistent with (12), this coincidence is only the result of some kind of symmetry inherent in the associated BPHF; such symmetry may not hold for all BPHFs in general, as illustrated in Examples 1 and 2. The points noted in this section underscore the need to set (11)-(13) in the proper perspective. Does there exist a scheme which will be truly optimal or equitable with respect to participant anonymity in the sense of ensuring the validity of (11)-(13) for a ) , ( n t threshold access structure given by any BPHF? In Section 4, we will present such a new scheme which will also entail gains in anonymity, compared to the ZS scheme, for both balanced and unbalanced PHFs; cf. Remarks 2-4 in that section.
Some inequalities related to anonymity measures
We continue with the ZS scheme, as given by a ) , , ; ( PHF t m n l which need not necessarily be balanced, and present some inequalities on the anonymity properties of this scheme. These will be needed in Section 4 for comparative purposes. As before, let B = ) 
Now by (9), the sum of the ) Therefore, the sum of the ) ,
, equals 1. Hence
(b) follows arguing as in (a). □
From Lemma 1 and the definitions of µ and ρ in (1) and (2), the following is evident.
Lemma 2. For the ZS scheme based on a
) , , ; ( PHF t m n l , (a) µ ≤ ) ( [min{ 1 J r q × − : l r ≤ ≤ 1 , 1 }] − ∆ ∈ J . (b) ρ ≤ : ) , ( [min{ 1 j r f − l r ≤ ≤ 1 , 1 }] 1 − ≤ ≤ m j . □
A new scheme: the proportional scheme
With reference to a ) , ( n t threshold access structure given by a ) , , ; ( PHF t m n l which may or may not be balanced, we propose the following new scheme:
uses a key with probability proportional to A s .
(ii) If a group ) ( Γ ∈ A uses a key, then it employs any of its available A s keys with equal probability.
While (ii) is the same as that for the ZS scheme, ) (i ′ differs from their (i) and takes cognizance of the variation in the A s values across . Γ ∈ A This modification will be seen to have useful consequences; in particular, when based on a ) , , ; ( BPHF t m n l , this new scheme provides completely equitable participant as well as group anonymity. Moreover, when m = t, this scheme ensures optimal participant anonymity too.
Hereafter, this new scheme given by ) (i ′ and (ii) will be referred to as the proportional scheme.
An algorithm for its easy implementation is presented in the next section. We now examine the behavior of this proportional scheme with respect to anonymity. 
Proof. (a) Using the same notation as in Section 3, by ) (i ′ ,
where 0 s equals the sum of the quantities A s , over . Γ ∈ A Also, (6) continues to hold because of (ii). Therefore, recalling that )
as a counterpart of (7). Now (a) follows from (6), (19) and (20) invoking the conditional probability formula (8).
(b) In view of (a), for n c ≤ ≤ 1 , as a counterpart of (10), we get . In view of (17), therefore, ) ( J r Q × consists of the groups of participants
and hence
Consider now a particular participant c P , with ) ,
, which include c P and
, so that by (21) and (23)
. Similarly, the conclusion of (b) holds for
then none of the groups, constituting ) ( J r Q × and listed in (22), can include c P . As a result, then
by (21). This completes the proof of (b). □
The next result is immediate from Theorem 1 and the definitions of µ and ρ in (1) and (2).
Theorem 2. For the proportional scheme based on a
. This, in conjunction with (23), implies that
, equality being attained in both cases if and only if ) , ( j r f = m n / for every r and j, in which case the PHF is balanced. Since t m ≥ , it follows that the expressions for µ and ρ in Theorem 2 satisfy
Therefore, from consideration of anonymity, given l, n and t, the proportional scheme should ide- 
The above results have major implications as remarked below. , the proportional scheme ensures the attainment of (13) and hence provides completely equitable participant anonymity. Furthermore, when m = t, by Corollary 1(a)(ii) and (d), this scheme ensures the attainment of (11) and (12) This algorithm is very similar to the one for the ZS scheme (ZS, p. 148) with the only change being that here selection of a non-separating row in Step II returns the algorithm to Step I, whereas in ZS selection of a non-separating row in Step II returns the algorithm to the beginning of Step II itself. The next result establishes that our algorithm, indeed, implements the proportional scheme. . Similarly, the probability that such a cycle is inconclusive (i.e., ends with a return to Step I) is
where 0 s is the sum of the quantities G s , over Γ ∈ G . Now, group A eventually makes use of a key if and only if there is one cycle of Steps I and II that ends with group A going to Step III, all previous cycles being inconclusive. Hence the probability for group A to use a key is
which proves (a). Part (b) is evident from symmetry considerations. □
Beyond PHFs
The proportional scheme appears to be quite promising even for ) , ( n t threshold access structures which are given by combinatorial entities other than PHFs. Consider a general setup with (i) p key components 1, 2, …, p,
, each of which is a set in {1, 2,…, p} and which together cover {1, 2,…, p}, and (iii) n participants n P P ,..., 1 among whom the key components are distributed, such that every group of t participants can recover at least one key, and no set of participants, involving less than t members, can recover any key.
As before, let Γ be the collection all groups of t participants. Analogously to (1)-(3), we now consider
as measures of overall group anonymity, overall participant anonymity, and anonymity for partici- 
for the proportional scheme. Thus the value of µ for the proportional scheme is never less than that under the ZS scheme. However, no such statement can be made in full generality about ρ because counterparts of the sets ) , ( j r F in (17) are no longer available here, thus precluding any extension of Lemma 2(b) and Theorem 2(b). Nevertheless, even in the general setup, the proportional scheme can perform better than the ZS scheme in respect of both µ and ρ . An illustrative example follows.
Example 6. Let t = 3 and p = n = 7. The key components distributed to participant c P , 7 1 ≤ ≤ c , are as listed in the cth column of the array P = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7, 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 4 5 6 7 1 2 3
i.e., 1 P gets key components 1, 2, 4, while 2 P gets 2, 3, 5, and so on. There are v = 7 keys i K , 7 1 ≤ ≤ i , where i K includes all key components except i . Thus each i K contains six key components. The columns of P, when interpreted as blocks, form a balanced incomplete block design.
Since any two distinct participants have exactly one common key component, it is easy to verify that the above gives a (3,7) threshold access structure, indeed. As in Example 2, let ) ,
